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I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between free trade among the nations of the
world and the impact on the environment has been acknowledged
by economists, environmentalists, and international legal
specialists since as early as 1970.1 The seemingly irreconcilable
dispute between trade and the environment has persisted into
the new millennium. Although recognized as being of significant
importance in the past, the recent display of opposition posited
by environmentalists outside the World Trade Organization
(WTO) gathering in Seattle reinforced the need to address this
issue immediately.! In the past, environmental trade concerns
have been afforded some deference by the WTO, as well as by
provisions of international legislation.'
This comment will discuss the strained relations that have
arisen between the United States and Mexico and other less
developed countries of South and Central America as a result of
the conflict between trade and the environment. Part II
1. See generally THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [WTO], Early years: Emerging
environment debate in GATTI WTO [hereinafter Early Years] available at
httpJ/www.wto.org/english/tratope/envir e/histl_e.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2000).
2. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Having It All: Trade, Development,
Environmental and Human Rights, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, May 5, 2000 at 2. Although
environmental issues were only secondary concerns to the trade disputes being addressed
at the WTO meeting in Seattle, many environmentalists rallied in the streets, donning
sea turtle or dolphin insignias as symbolic reminders of the recent Panel and Appellate
Body decisions. Protesters demonstrated their fear that multilateral trade regulations
would sacrifice the United States' environmental standards to further the interests of free
trade. Significant doubt has been raised as to whether these activists had actually read
the text of the decisions which recognized the United States' right to legislate to protect
endangered species and to protect its domestic air quality. The reasoning behind the
decisions of the Panels and Appellate Bodies rested on the fact that § 609 of the
Endangered Species Act and the Environmental Protection Agency rules as to gasoline
standards failed the nondiscriminatory application requirements of GATT. It is likely
that the protestors were unaware that many of the challenges to the United States
regulations were made by developing countries that could not afford to be sanctioned by
United States standards. Ironically, the United States has narrowed the range of
domestic legislation that is aimed at protecting the public health. It did so by being the
most aggressive challenger of the European Union's ban on hormone-fed beef. Id.
3. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS 21(1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 28 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. For the
purposes of this comment, GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 are collectively referred to as
GATT.
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discusses the history of legislation aimed at alleviating this
conflict. Part III examines the legal decisions reflecting the
application of the relevant international law, including the
failures by the United States at implementing the environmental
exceptions. Part IV explores possibilities of reconciling the
conflict between trade and the environment and consists of
suggestions as to how future efforts can be legally sustained.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FREE
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Trade and the environment has been a subject of dispute
since as early as 1970.' In November of 1971, the GATT Council
organized a Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade (EMIT), which was open to all Member
nations.' However, the group's effectiveness was inherently
limited since the decision establishing the group stipulated that
it would only convene at the request of GATT members.6 EMIT
would gain support twenty years later when in compliance with
its mandate, it examined the effects of environmental protection
schemes on international trade and studied the transparency and
relationships between multilateral trade agreements and
multilateral environmental protection agreements.7
Meanwhile, the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference was held in
recognition of a need for an international forum in which to hear
environmental management concerns.! In the talks that followed
the Stockholm Conference, GATT members referred to the
creation of EMIT as precedent and made suggestions as to a
mechanism by which issues of trade and the environment might
be addressed more effectively.9 During the 1986-1994 Uruguay
Round of negotiations, a ministerial decision created the
Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE). °
4. See generally Early Years, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. EMIT was first convened in 1991, 20 years after its creation. See id.
8. Id. During the Stockholm Conference, the Secretariat of GATT prepared its own
study focusing on trade implications of environmental protection policies. The study
reflected the general concern among Members that such policies could become barriers to
trade and could lead to a new form of protectionism known as "green protectionism." See
id.
9. See id.
10. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Relevant WTO Provisions: Text of 1994
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In a report titled Our Common Future (the Brundtland
Report), the World Commission on Environment and
Development coined the term "sustainable development."" This
report was in response to the dilemma posed by the social and
economic ills of poverty." Unfortunately, the effects of poverty
often cause a vicious cycle that can be difficult for undeveloped
and less developed nations to overcome. The Commission
recognized that an increase in global trade would lead to greater
economic growth, thereby generating technological and other
advantages necessary to rise up against the "pollution of
poverty."
13
The first major disruption leading to the need for more
initiative among trade and environmental policies was a dispute
between Mexico and the United States. 4  The 1991 case,
discussed in more detail in Part III, involved a United States
embargo on tuna imported from countries utilizing purse seine
nets." Incident to the fishing of tuna, large numbers of dolphins
were killed in these particular nets. Mexico made its case before
the GATT Panel, claiming that the United States' embargo was
inconsistent with its obligations under international law." The
basis of the Panel's report in favor of Mexico was that the
embargo regulated Mexico's mode of production, not its
conditions of sale. 7 The Panel decided that the United States,
under the GATT, had to treat Mexico's product as favorably as it
treated the equivalent domestic product, regardless of the
procedures used to harvest the tuna."
Decision available at http-//www.wto.org/englishtratop-eenvir e/issu5_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2000). The CTE was given the role of integrating international trade and the
environment so as to further each through the support of the other. Id.
11. See generally Early Years, supra note 1.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See generally GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Restrictions On
Imports Of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39' Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter
Dolphin 1].
15. Id. at 156.
16. Id. at 161.
17. Id. at 194. The Panel decision was not adopted by GATT members, but is
significant for its triggering of subsequent challenges to utilization of the Article XX
exception to the GATT. See Article XX of GATT 1994.
18. Id. at 195. While arriving at a decision in the Mexican tuna case, the Panel
noted that the GATT 1994 was not clear as to whether the resources sought to be
protected could fall outside the jurisdiction of the Member adopting the environmental
controls. Upon inspecting the legislative history of Article XX of the GATT (now GATT
1994), Panel Members concluded that its drafters did not intend for it to extend to other
[Vol. 32:1
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Again attention was drawn to the need for sustainable
development at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio
"Earth Summit."2 The Summit focused on the need to alleviate
poverty in furtherance of protecting the environment."
In April of 1994, towards the end of the Uruguay Round,
GATT members established the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in Marrakesh, Morocco.2 The importance of placing
environmental concerns on the Organization's agenda was
apparent by the words of the preamble to the Marrakesh
Agreement.2 The term "sustainable development," described
previously in the Brundtland Report, reappeared, indicating the
WTO's recognition of the need for a mechanism to balance trade
and environmental protection.2
Since the formation of the WTO, the preambular language
has been called upon by the WTO Appellate Body in determining
the outcome of the shrimp-turtle case, the latest in a series of
environmentally sensitive trade disputes before the WTO."4 In
countries that were not imposing the environmental controls. As a result, the decision
had the potential to lead to even lower environmental standards than would have been
imposed domestically. Hence, the decision has been highly criticized by
environmentalists citing multilateral trade agreements as obstacles to effective
environment protection. Id.
19. See generally Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action From Rio,
UN Doc. DPT11344, UN Sales No. E.93.1.11 (1993) [hereinafter Earth Charter].
20. Id. See also Early Years, supra note 1 (discussing Agenda 21, the method of
action fashioned at the conference that furthered EMIT's idea of sustainable development
by recognizing the importance of international trade). See also LAW & PRACTICE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
21. See WTO Agreement preamble.
22. Id. The preamble of the WTO Agreement states that the WTO Member nations
acknowledge:
[T]hat their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of
and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.
23. Id.
24. See generally WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Import Prohibition Of
Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R,(Oct. 12, 1998), available at
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addition, a ministerial decision arising out of Marrakesh in 1994
declared that there should be no reason for strain between
policies supporting an "open, non-discriminatory and equitable
multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the
protection of the environment, and the promotion of sustainable
development on the other."
25
Along with the trade-related environmental policy furthered
by the establishment of the WTO, the preexisting environmental
policy considerations embodied in the GATT were also given new
emphasis. 6 Simultaneously, attention had to be given to certain
other provisions of the GATT, which require non-discrimination
by means of the concepts of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment7
and National Treatment. 8 These provisions are necessary within
a system of multilateral trade in order to prevent protectionism
by Members utilizing environmental concerns as a disguise for
giving preferential treatment to their own producers."5 Non-
discrimination goes beyond protecting imported products from
discriminatory preference of domestic products, it also ensures
that a Member does not arbitrarily discriminate among various
importing Members."
Requirements of non-discrimination aside, GATT provides
http://www.WTO.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/58abr.htm (noting the importance of the
language and stating, "we believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.").
25. See generally LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Decision
on Trade and Environment,(1995)[hereinafter DTEJ at 53.
26. See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Relevant WTO Provisions: Texts,
available at http//www.wto.org/english/tratop e/envir-efissu4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2000) [hereinafter WTO Texts].
27. See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Relevant WTO Provisions: Descriptions,
available at 27. See THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Relevant WTO Provisions:
Descriptions, available at http://www.wto.orgfenglisldtratop-.eenvire/issu3-e.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2000)[hereinafter Descriptions]. Article I of the GATT 1994 requires
WTO members to extend the same treatment to one Member's exported products as to
other Members' similar or equivalent exported products. Most-favoured-nation treatment
(MFN) means that a country shall not discriminate between "like" products that are
imported from other GATT trading partners. "Like" products are same or equivalent
products, which should be given same or equivalent treatment as required by the non-
discrimination principles of the GATT. This assures that all Members are on equal footing
and that less developed countries benefit from all multilateral trade negotiations. Id.
28. See id. (explaining that Article III of GATT 1994 requires another form of non-
discrimination, the concept of national treatment, which means that a Member shall not






significant scope with which to address environmental trade
concerns." Admittedly not an environmental protection agency,
and having no desire to become one, WTO Members have limited
the parameters of discussion to recognizing the advantage of
trade liberalization as a solution to the growing concern about
deterioration of the environment." The WTO has emphasized
the fact that free trade has a direct impact on the economies of
developing nations because it offers opportunities for a transfer
of financial and technological resources.33
The paradoxical relationship between free trade and
protecting the environment is often difficult to reconcile. Non-
discrimination principles encourage the free flow of trade while
potentially compromising a nation's high environmental
standards. However, Article XX of the GATT does provide
exceptions to the non-discrimination requirements when
necessary to protect "human, animal, or plant life or health."34
The introductory paragraph to the specific exceptions, the
"chapeau," dictates that any attempt to adopt policy measures
resulting in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or
representing a "disguised restriction on international trade" will
not be tolerated.35
Another Article XX exception lies for instances in which
efforts are being made relating to the conservation of
"exhaustible natural resources." 6 Again, this exception is subject
to the non-protectionist requirements of the chapeau.37





34. See Descriptions, supra note 27.
35. See id. See also GATT 1994, Article XX. Article XX lists "General Exceptions" to
the GATT rules (including those requiring non-discrimination). Article XX states that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
•.. (b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
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Among agreements made by the WTO, the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, (the TBT Agreement), has provided
another tool by which concerned nations may ensure certain
environmental standards.3 8 This can be accomplished by a
country's adoption of environmentally sensitive technical
regulations, standards, and conformity requirements, which
must be satisfied by foreign producers in order for them to be
given access to the market.3 9
The TBT Agreement recognizes that uniform standards are
essential within a society to ensure compatibility, the efficiency
of operations, and the quality of exports." This ideal of
harmonization of standards among WTO nations implanted fear
in the minds of environmentalists who were concerned that there
would be a "race to the bottom" as to environmental standards.4'
However, the Agreement also acknowledges that measures
necessary for the protection of the environment are essential to
the resulting quality of exports.42 Despite recognition of the need
to protect the environment, and the provisions setting forth the
right to do so, the TBT Agreement was designed to ensure that
all measures taken are nondiscriminatory and not designed
merely to give domestic producers an advantage."
38. See LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON
TECHNICAL BARRIERS To TRADE, March 1995 at 135 [hereinafter TBT Agreement] (stating
purpose of the TBT Agreement is to ensure that no unnecessary barriers to trade are
imposed by a country's utilization of specifications). See ALSO ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F.
MURPHY, CASES AND MATEIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND
ECONOMIC RELATONS,(2d ed. 1999) at 571 [hereinafter Swan & Murphy](explaining that
technical regulations and standards refer to myriad specifications such as thickness and
strength of metals, voltage of electrical appliances, quality of meats or agricultural
products, weights and measures, and performance standards of machines).
39. See TBT Agreement, supra note 38 at 135. The preamble of the Agreement
contains language similar to that of the chapeau of Article XX, emphasizing the
proscription of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade.
See id.
40. Swan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 571.
41. See id. generally.
42. See TBT Agreement supra note 38, at 135.
43. See id. at 136. Article 2.2 of the Agreement states:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted, or applied with the view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose,
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter
alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive
practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
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Following the heightened awareness of the potential conflict
between free trade and the environment raised during the
Uruguay Round, the WTO issued a Decision on Trade and the
Environment." The objectives behind the Decision included the
WTO's aim for "optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so. . .." " This objective also took
into consideration the differing concerns among nations at
various levels of economic development.46
The Decision on Trade and the Environment also initiated
the formation of a Committee in Trade and the Environment. 7
As within the framework of the Trade Negotiations Committee
Decision of 15 December 1993, the Committee was to take into
consideration the objective of sustainable development and to
make suggestions as to implementing policies in an equitable and
non-discriminatory fashion. 8 The latter aspect of this task
included facilitating interaction between concerns about trade
and the environment, while respecting the needs of less
developed countries, avoiding disguised protectionism by
monitoring measures being taken, and implementing the
multilateral disciplines available.49
The Decision on Trade and Environment also charged the
Committee with several issues to be addressed in furtherance of
making environmental and international trade policies mutually
supportive."0 Upon completion of this work by the Committee,
health, or the environment....
44. DTE, supra note 25. This 1994 ministerial decision stated boldly that:
"[T]here should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding and
safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on
the one hand, and acting for the protection of the environment, and the promotion of
sustainable development on the other.... " Id. at 53.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 54. The Committee was to be open to all interested WTO members who
would later report recommendations and findings to the WTO at the first biennial
meeting of the Ministerial Conference. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The matters which were to be addressed were: the relationship between
existing provisions of the multilateral trading system and environmental trade measures;
the relationship between effects of trade and the environmental provisions of the
multilateral trading system; imposition of fees and taxes for environmental purposes;
product-related standards such as labeling, packaging, recycling, and technical
20011
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and pending the next meeting of the General Council of the
WTO, Sub-Committees would be established in order to carry out
the objectives determined by the Committee.5' Both the
Committee on Trade and Environment and the Sub-Committees
established in furtherance of its findings were invited by the
Decision on Trade and Environment to provide input to relevant
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations of the
WTO.
52
With respect to these aims of the WTO, it is also important
to acknowledge the fact that there are limits to the scope of the
Organization's involvement in environmental policy. The WTO is
by no means a global environmental protection agency. 53 The
depth of the WTO's involvement expands only to trade-related
aspects of environmental policy. The Members of the WTO, in
consideration of trade-related policies bearing an effect on the
environment and vice versa, do not operate on the premise that
they have a solution to environmental problems." In order to
maintain this mutuality of interests, the WTO liberalizes trade
while allowing for legislation that adequately protects the
environment. The WTO also safeguards against Members
illegally gaining an advantage by utilizing environmental
provisions to erect barriers to trade.55
Lack of coordination at the national level has led to failures
in the past at negotiating international agreements as to trade
and environmental problems.56 The WTO has recognized that the
best solution to global environmental concerns is the negotiation
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Such
agreements shield against a country addressing its
regulations; requirements of transparency of environmental measures having an effect on
trade as provided for by the multilateral trading system; the correlation between dispute
settlement mechanisms provided for by the multilateral system and those contained in
multilateral environmental agreements; and the effect on developing nations' access to
markets as a result of environmental measures, including the resulting benefits to the
environment from removing trade restrictions and distortions. See id. at 54-55.
51. Id at 55.
52. Id.
53. See Parameters, supra note 31.
54. See id. (stating that the WTO has repeatedly expressed the view that
environmental and trade policies do complement each other and acknowledging that
economic growth depends upon an abundance of natural resources and that liberalization





environmental concerns unilaterally and discriminating against
other producer nations.57  This practice (known as
"extraterritoriality") occurs when a nation attempts to impose its
standards and laws on a country that is beyond its jurisdiction.58
As the law currently stands, the preferred method of dealing with
the ongoing dispute between international trade and the
environment is by means of consensus and multilateral
agreement. 9  Unfortunately, despite efforts of justifying its
behavior as necessary to protect the environment, the United
States has not yet been successful in overcoming what have
become the obstacles posed by the chapeau of Article XX.
III. SHRIMP, TUNA AND REFORMULATED GASOLINE: PANEL
AND APPELLATE BODY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
The first of a series of disputes to arise out of the United
States' efforts at protecting the environment occurred in
February of 1991 when Mexico requested a GATT panel to
determine the legality of certain United States legislation."0
Mexico brought the action (hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I) in
response to an embargo placed on the importation of its tuna into
the United States."' The embargo was imposed pursuant to the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).6
2
57. Id. One case of an unsuccessful attempt at unilateral action was at the heart of
the dispute between Mexico and the United States with the tuna and dolphin debate. See
Part III infra.
58. Id.
59. See id. (expressing WTO's resort to multilateral environmental agreements at
the Rio "Earth Summit" conference (UNCED) in 1992). See also Earth Charter, supra
note 19.
60. See generally Dolphin 1, supra note 14. The case was handled under the old
GATT procedure, prior to formation of the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism.
61. Id. at 161.
62. The MMPA "requires a general prohibition of "taking" (harassment, hunting,
capture, killing or attempt thereof) and importation into the United States of marine
mammals..." See id. at 156. Tuna from Mexico and "intermediary nations" was being
denied access to the United States market. See id. at 161. The purpose of the legislation
was to reduce the number of incidental killings of dolphins occurring while tuna were
being fished in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The use of purse-seine nets to
catch tuna in this particular region was very likely to lead to the killing or disturbance of
dolphins, as the dolphins were often found swimming above the schools of tuna, and were
2001]
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The MMPA regulated the capture of yellowfin tuna in hope
of reducing dolphin mortality incident to purse-seine and driftnet
fishing methods. Some United States (domestic) vessels were
given licenses to fish in the ETP region upon their agreement
and compliance with a rule establishing an incidental killing
maximum of 20,500 dolphins per year. The MMPA also required
that the United States Government forbid the importation of
products that were caught using dolphin-disruptive methods
resulting in incidental deaths in excess of the United States
standards. In order to qualify for importation, the foreign
products had to prove to the United States authorities that its
regulation scheme was comparable to the regulatory system set
up by the MMPA.6" Furthermore, once it had been found by
United States authorities that a certain country's fleet did not
qualify, importation from "intermediary nations" that had not
acted to ban tuna imports from the offending nation were also
subject to an embargo. '
Mexico alleged that the MMPA and the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)"5 violated Articles 1, 111, XI,
and XIII of the GATT.6" Mexico not only disputed a direct
embargo that was placed on its tuna exports on March 26, 1991
and an "intermediary nations" embargo of May 24, 1991, but also
challenged the DPCIA labeling provisions, which took effect on
in fact indicative of the presence of fish. The fishermen would deliberately follow the
dolphins on the surface, encircling them with nets in order to capture the tuna
underneath them. This resulted in the death of 6 to 8 million dolphins since 1959. See
Jennifer L. Croston & Carol J. Miller, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives:
Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act; World Trade
Organization, 37(1) AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 74-75 (1999).
63. See Croston & Miller, supra note 62, at 98 (explaining that in order to be
considered comparable to the United States scheme, foreigners had to certify that the
incidental "taking" of dolphins by their vessels did not exceed 1.25 times that of the
average rate of the United States operating during the same time period).
64. See Dolphin L, supra note 14, at 158-160.
65. See Croston & Miller, supra note 62.
The DCPIA determines the standards that must be met in order for a finished tuna
product to be labeled with the term "Dolphin Safe." This system applied to both domestic
and imported tuna, and gave consumers the option of whether or not to buy the product.
The DCPIA stipulates that it is a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)
to falsely affix the "Dolphin Safe" label to any product that was harvested 1) in the ETP
with the use of purse-seine nets not meeting the conditions rendering the product dolphin
safe, or 2)engaging in the use of driftnet fishing (10 to 15 mile long weighted fishing nets,
reeled in by the ship, resulting in fish together with other surface-level marine life being
dropped onto the ship) on the high seas. Id. at 99-100.




Specifically, Mexico claimed with respect to the MMPA, that
its terms violated the general prohibition of quantitative
restrictions of Article XI.68 According to Mexico, the MMPA also
violated Article XIII in that it created discriminatory conditions
for a specific geographical area."5 Mexico further alleged that the
conditions of comparison of the Mexican yellowfin tuna and the
American tuna violated Article II.7°
According to Mexico, a corresponding subsection of the
MMPA, the "Pelly Amendment" of the Fishermen's Protective Act
of 1967, was itself a violation of Article XI."1  The Pelly
Amendment provides for the President's use of discretion in the
prohibition of imports on all fish products six months after the
imposition of an embargo."2
As to the inclusion of "intermediary nations" to the embargo
on tuna, Mexico challenged the United States' ability under
Article XI to do so, as well as its ability to extend the Pelly
Amendment's application to these nations." Mexico further
contested the United States labeling procedure (the DPCIA) on
the grounds that it violated Articles I and IX due to its
imposition of discriminatory and unfavorable conditions for a
specific geographical region."
In response, the United States insisted that the measures
were indeed consistent with the GATT, and would, in the
alternative, be justified under the exceptions of Article XX(b)
XX(d) and XX(g). 6 The United States asserted that the yellowfin
tuna measures were "internal regulations affecting the sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
tuna and tuna products consistent with Article III:4," and that in
the absence of conformity with GATT, the regulations would
nonetheless be valid under Article XX (b) and XX (g).7 6  The
67. Id. at 161.
68. Id. at 162.
69. Id. at 161.
70. See id. at 161, para. 3.1(c).
71. Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Protection of Vessels on the High Seas and in
Territorial Waters of Foreign Countries, 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a).
72. See generally Dolphin I, supra note 14.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 162.
76. Id. at 161-62.
2001]
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United States also claimed that the same conditions and
exceptions would apply to "intermediary nations.""
With regard to Mexico's attack on the DCPIA, the United
States countered that its terms were not subject to Article IX, but
rather Articles I and III, and that the DCPIA was consistent with
them since the discrimination was levied as to the waters in
which the fish was caught, not the country of origin."
The GATT Panel considered the issues raised by Mexico in
light of the Article XX exceptions raised by the United States and
submitted its findings on August 16, 1991.79 The prohibition of
imports of tuna and tuna products pursuant to the MMPA was
found to be inconsistent with Article XI:I of the GATT and was
not justifiable under either of the Article XX exceptions."0 The
United States' claim that Article III would apply failed because
the regulations controlling the harvesting of the tuna could not
affect tuna as a final product. The United States was therefore
obligated to accord the same treatment to the imported product
as that given to the same domestic product, despite Mexico's
incidental taking of dolphins.8 The MMPA was also found
inconsistent with Article XI since it involved a quantitative
restriction on imports.8
77. See id. at 162 (stating that as to "intermediary nations," Article XX (d) was also
claimed to apply).
78. Id.
79. Id. In examining the complaint, the Panel considered the practices of banning
imports of certain yellowfin tuna products from Mexico and "intermediary nations",
(including the provisions of the MMPA), the extension of the ban to all fish via the Pelly
Amendment, and the labeling provisions of the DPCIA. Id. at 156.
80. Id. at 205. In determining Mexico's claim that the MMPA violated Article XI
prohibitions on quantitative restrictions and the United States' insistence that the
measures were Article III internal regulations, the Panel noted that, under Article 111:4,
GATT members are allowed to impose internal regulations so long as there is no
discrimination between products of other countries in violation of Article 1:1 MFN
principles. See supra note 27. The United States has claimed that the direct import
embargo was an enforcement of the MMPA requiring that tuna be harvested in such a
way as to reduce the incidental killing of dolphins. It did not regulate the sale of tuna as
a product, but rather the method by which it was produced. This raised the issue of
whether the regulations were applied to domestic and imported tuna within the meaning
of Article III and would be consistent with the provision. The Panel reasoned that since
the text of Article 111:1 refers to imported or domestic products and that such regulations
be applied in accordance with GATT principles, the MMPA regulations "could not be
regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because they would not directly
regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product." Dolphin I,
supra note 14, at 195.
81. Dolphin , supra note 14, at 195.
82. See id. at 196 (citing Article XI:I which reads: "No prohibitions or
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
A previous Panel had recognized that Article XX was
available to allow imposition of trade measures to pursue
"overriding public policy goals" when otherwise unavoidable. 3
However, there was a caveat: for the exception to apply, the trade
measures had to withstand scrutiny as being "necessary" and not
a means of "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" or a
"disguised restriction" on international trade."4 Additionally, the
method by which Mexican fishermen were to gauge the requisite
standards was deemed unpredictable since it was linked to the
performance of United States fishermen during the same time
period. Such an unpredictable limitation on trade could hardly
be considered "necessary" to protect marine mammals.' 5
Invocation of the exceptions failed since the Panel determined
that the United States had not exhausted reasonable alternative
measures available to accomplish its purpose."
The secondary embargo as to "intermediary nations" and the
related MMPA provisions were also found to be contrary to
Article XI:1 and were not covered by the Article XX exceptions."
However, the Pelly Amendment and its application toward
further bans on fish imports was found to be consistent with the
United States obligations under GATT with respect to both types
of embargoes.88
Additionally, the tuna labeling provisions of the DPCIA were
found to be consistent with the most-favoured-nation and
restrictions... whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party..." and noting that the
United States had offered no alternative reading of this GATT provision).
83. Id. at 199.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 198. Insisting on the application of Article XX (b) and XX (g)
exceptions, the United States pointed out that there were no other reasonable measures
that could be taken since the protected species were outside the United States' territorial
jurisdiction. Id. The Panel noted that international cooperation was a measure that the
United States could have taken rather than imposing unilateral trade policies. Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 202-202. Much of the Panel's reasoning was the same as that of its
decision concerning the primary embargo against Mexico. Again, since the regulations
were not aimed at tuna as a product, the prohibition against quantitative restrictions
applied. Id.
88. Id. at 205. Since the Pelly Amendment merely gave authority to act




national-treatment provisions of Article I:1 of GATT. 9 Mexico
had argued that the "Dolphin Safe" label discriminated against
Mexico as a producer of tuna. The Panel acknowledged that the
labeling requirement did not block access to the United States
market as the tuna could be sold freely either with or without the
label. The only possible advantage would depend on the
consumer's decision to choose the "Dolphin Safe" label over other
tuna.90
In determining these findings, the Panel emphasized the fact
that its decision rested merely on relevant GAIT provisions and
was not demonstrative of any position as to Mexico or the United
States environmental policies.9' The Panel also acknowledged
that Contracting Parties were free to regulate products, but could
not do so merely because its environmental policies were
inconsistent with those of other trading Members.92 The Panel
also insisted that it did not limit the reach of the Article XX
exceptions, but rather applied GATT principles to counter
possible abuse.9  The concluding remarks also made the
suggestion that if Contracting Parties so desired, they could and
should amend or supplement the existing GATT provisions to
permit environmental trade measures that would otherwise be
inconsistent with it as written at the time.94  Again, the
importance of multilateral cooperation in order to address
international environmental problems was stressed.9
Despite its triumph before the GATT Panel, Mexico decided
89. Id. Despite a challenge under Article IX: 1, which reads, "Each contracting party
shall accord to the products of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with
regard to marking requirements no less favorable than the treatment accorded to like
products of any third country." the labeling provisions were deemed satisfactory since
there was no national treatment requirement embodied in Article XI. Rather, there was
only a requirement of MFN treatment. This was interpreted to mean that the marking
provision only applied to imported products and not the general marking of both domestic
and imported products. Id.
90. See id. at 203. (finding that because access to the right to use the "Dolphin-Safe"
label depended only upon documentary evidence proving that the tuna was not harvested
using purse-seine nets to intentionally encircle and trap dolphins, the United States was
not discriminating against any particular nation, nor was it distinguishing between fish
originating in Mexico or any other country).







that it would not pursue sanctions against the United States."6
Instead, the two countries worked through the problem by
initiating bilateral agreements outside of the GATT sphere. 7
Since the dispute was handled under the old GATT system,
which required a consensus to accept the decision before it would
be adopted, the decision was not adopted.9
In April of 1992, the European Economic Community and
the Netherlands brought their own case disputing the legitimacy
of the embargoes on tuna and tuna products.99 A second panel
decision, upholding some of the prior panel's findings while
modifying others, was issued in 1994, and was also governed by
the old GATT procedures."'
As an inherent theme of the report, the Panel recognized the
need to promote sustainable development and thus declined to
pass judgment on the validity of the dolphin conservation efforts
of the United States.'' The issue was whether the United States
had the right to secure changes in another country's domestic
policies by imposing trade embargoes. Answering the question in
the negative, the Panel noted that Article XX of the GATT lent no
support to this theory.
Both the United States' "primary nation embargo" and the
"intermediary nation embargo" were found contrary to Article
XI:1 of the GATT.' Since the embargoes prohibited the import
of tuna or tuna products from any country that failed to meet
certain policy requirements, the embargoes were "prohibitions of
restrictions" that were inconsistent with Article XI:1.1°0 The
Panel also said that since none of the policies, practices and
methods had any impact on tuna as a product, the Note ad of
96. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Beyond the Agreements: The Tuna-Dolphin
Dispute, available at http'/www.wto.org/english/thewtoe whatis_e/tifLe/bey5_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Dispute].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions On Imports On
Tuna, DS29/R, Jun. 16, 1994, 1994 WL 907620, at 2 [hereinafter Dolphin I].
100. Id.
101. Id. at 40.
102. Id. at 35. GATT Article XI:I states that "No prohibitions or restrictions other
than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party."
See id. at 34.
103. Id. at 35.
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Article III would not apply.
0 4
The Panel developed a procedure for determining whether
the exception of Article XX(g) would apply in this case.'05 The
United States prevailed in the sense that the Panel deemed the
restriction to conserve dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean to be a valid policy to conserve an exhaustible natural
resource.' In reaching this conclusion, the Panel also noted that
there was no reason to limit the provisions of Article XX(g) to
resources located within the territory of the country imposing the
restrictions.0 7 However the United States' efforts collapsed when
the Panel went on to determine whether the restrictions were
"related to" and made "in conjunction" with domestic
consumption and production. The Panel found that forcing other
countries to change their policies was not "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of exhaustible resources. It acknowledged the
grim fact that these types of policies would not be effective at
conserving exhaustible resources unless such changes actually
occurred.0 8 In reaching this conclusion, this Panel agreed with
the reasoning of the previous one in its interpretation of the
language of Article XX. Consistent with the analysis in Tuna-
Dolphin I, the Panel read "relating to" to mean "primarily aimed"
at conservation and "in conjunction with" to mean "primarily
aimed" at rendering the restrictions on the country's domestic
production and consumption efforts effective.' 0 Standing alone,
104. Id. at 34. The Note to Article III extends the national treatment requirement of
Article III to domestic measures that are instituted at the time or point of importation. It
states in part, "any law, regulation or requirement.. .which applies to an imported
product and to the like domestic product and is enforced in the case of the imported
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as... subject to
the provisions of Article III." See id.
105. Dolphin II, supra note 98, at 35. The Panel had to determine: 1)whether the
policy being questioned fell within the range of policies aimed at conserving exhaustible
natural resources; 2)whether the measure being taken was "related to" conservation and
was made effective "in conjunction" with restrictions on the country's domestic
consumption and production of the resource; and 3)whether the measure complied with
the requirements of the chapeau which required that the measure not be applied in an
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner and not as a disguised restriction on trade. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 36. The Panel referred to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
as a means of interpretation of other treaties and their relevance to interpretation of the
GATT. Id. The Panel also concluded that any subsequent agreements made bilaterally or
plurilaterally were not applicable to interpretation of the GATT since not all Members,
only the parties to the dispute, were involved in the process. Id.
108. Dolphin II, supra note 98, at 38.
109. Id. at 37.
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both the "primary nation" embargo and the "intermediary nation"
embargo failed to satisfy this Article XX requirement because
neither would ensure actual changes in the policies of the
exporting nations.'
A similar analytical framework was applied in denying the
applicability of the Article XX(b) exception for the protection of
"human, animal, or plant life or health.""' Again, the imposition
of the measures was considered ineffective since changes would
only occur if the other countries changed their policies. Since the
restriction would most likely be ineffective, it could not satisfy
the essential condition that it be "necessary.""'
Once again the United States had failed to establish the
necessity and primary aim of its environmental policy. Other
environmental cases which follow in Part B and C of this section
involve the same and additional weaknesses in the United States'
efforts to invoke the protection of Article XX."
3
B. United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline
Following the formation if the WTO, Venezuela and Brazil
requested that a panel be formed to decide whether certain
United States regulations, the Clean Air Act ("CAA")" 4 and the
EPA's Gasoline Rule"5 were violative of GATT."' In defense of its
110. Id.
111. Id. at 38.
112. Id. at 40.
113. See generally Tuna-Dolphin Dispute, supra note 95. This decision was never
adopted since there was no consensus by all Members to do so. Since the United States
had not resolved its studies on the panel report, it did not vote to adopt the decision. See
id.
114. Report of the Panel, United States - Standards For Reformulated And
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R,(Jan. 29, 1996) at l[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline
I]. The purpose of the Clean Air Act was to prevent and control air pollution in the United
States. Gasoline refiners, blenders, and importers were subject to this regulation. Id.
115. See id. at 2. The gasoline market is divided into two parts; "ozone nonattainment
areas," heavily polluted regions of the United States where only reformulated gasoline
may be sold to consumers, and the rest of the United States, in which regular, or
"conventional" gasoline can be sold, provided it is determined to be no dirtier than it was
in the base year of 1990. Each domestic refiner is required to maintain a yearly average
that is equivalent to or better than its "individual baseline" average produced in 1990.
The methods of determining a domestic refiner's individual baseline involve: 1)showing
evidence of the quality of gasoline that was produced in 1990; and 2)utilizing data to show
the quality of blendstock used in 1990. If insufficient data are drawn from the previous
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policies, the United States invoked the protection of Article
XX(b),(d), and (g) to justify its actions as environmental trade
policies.117 In January of 1996, the Panel issued its decision
concluding that the baseline establishment methods were
inconsistent with Article 111:4 of GATT and that Article XX could
not be used to justify the United States policies.
118
According to Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994, with respect to
regulations on internal sale, Members are bound to treat the
product of another territory no less favorably than the like
product of national origin.9 After finding that the Gasoline Rule
and CAA were in fact a regulation on the internal sale of an
imported product, the Panel noted that chemically-equivalent
imported and domestic gasoline with the same physical
properties and end uses were being treated differently.' This
resulted in less favorable sales conditions for the imported
gasoline since most importers were required to meet the
statutory baseline rather than the more easily-satisfied
individual baseline required of most domestic refiners.' This
effectively stripped importers of the benefit of selling a
competitive product as extraneous factors would affect its price
and hence, its marketability. The importer would be forced to
account for cost and price considerations, and would have to
compensate for the gasoline that fell below the statutory
guideline in order to import other gasoline to balance out its
average.'22 In response to this claim, the United States argued
that the statutory baseline merely reflected the average in 1990
two methods, then post-1990 gasoline blendstock is used (Method three). Importers are
only allowed to determine their individual baseline via Method one. If unable to
determine their baseline using Method one, importers must comply with the "statutory
baseline," which is calculated from the averages of all gasoline consumed in the United
States during 1990. Id.
116. Id. at 5. Brazil and Venezuela claimed violations of Articles I (MFN), III
(National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), 111:1, and 111:4 of GATT 1994.
Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 46 (stating that the Panel's role in determining whether any
environmental policy reviewed is consistent with the GATT 1994 is not to pass judgment
on the legitimacy or desirability of the particular environmental objectives, such as those
promulgated in the CAA and the Gasoline Rule, but rather to determine whether such
objectives were consistent with GA r).
119. See generally GATI 1994, supra note 3.
120. See Reformulated Gasoline I, supra note 113.




and therefore did not afford preferential treatment to domestic
refiners."'
The Panel found that the United States' argument reflected
the notion that less favorable treatment in one instance could be
offset by more favorable treatment in another."4 A previous
panel had determined that the no less favorable requirement
extended to each individual case of imported products, not to a
class of products as a whole.' If Article 111:4 were examined in
any other light, great uncertainty in the conditions of competition
would altogether undermine the fundamental purposes of Article
111.126
In making a determination as to whether Article XX(b),
which provides an exception when necessary "to protect human,
animal or plant life or health," the Panel examined the facts with
the guidance of the test that was employed in the Dolphin Tuna
II dispute.' As to the first prong of the test, the Panel agreed
with the United States that a policy designed to protect the
environment by restricting the consumption of gasoline did fall
within the ambit of Article XX." s The Panel then proceeded to
examine whether the policy was "necessary," meaning that there
were no alternative GATT 94-consistent methods by which the
restricting country could achieve its objectives."' On this point,
the Panel disagreed with the United States on both the
effectiveness of its current regulations and the ability to achieve
the results by less GATT 94-inconsistent means."' The Gasoline
Rule did not ensure that the gasoline governed by individual
baselines would conform with the 1990 average levels. Since
there was no maximum production limit set for domestic refiners,
those refiners which had a smaller share of the market in 1990
could in theory increase their market share, taking advantage of
123. Id. at 35.
124. Id. at 35-36.
125. See id. at 35.
126. See id. at 36.
127. See id. at 37. In order to be given the protection of the exception, the following
elements had to be established: First, the regulatory policy had to fall within the range of
policies developed to protect human, animal or pant life or health. Second, the policy had
to be "necessary" to fulfil the environmental objective. Third, the restriction had to satisfy
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. Id.
128. Id. at 38.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 40.
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the lower baseline requirement and produce more gasoline.3
This would skew the results of the overall 1990 average that
importers were required to conform with and simultaneously
defeat the purposes of the regulation. 112 The other United States
contentions that gaming and lack of ability to enforce compliance
with its regulations made the regulation necessary were also
rejected by the Panel.3 ' The Panel referred to other situations in
which the United States was engaged in enforcement
mechanisms with other countries."'
In concluding that the United States had failed to
demonstrate the necessity of its regulations on gasoline, the
Panel declined to examine whether or not the regulations would
have been consistent with the chapeau of Article XX. It
proceeded to consider whether Article XX(g), the exception for
exhaustible natural resources, would apply."' Again, the Panel
determined whether the restriction satisfied all the elements of
the test derived from Article XX and its chapeau. 8' The Unites
States had argued over Venezuela's contentions to the contrary,
that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource.3 7 Air
pollution could also lead to further exhaustion by contaminating
natural bodies of water, farmlands, reserves, and forests. The
Panel agreed that clean air was natural and had value, and was
therefore a resource.' 8 Venezuela's argument that unlike coal,
air was renewable failed to pass muster.'39 The Panel referred to
a previous case in which it had been determined that "renewable
stocks of salmon could constitute an exhaustible natural
resource."' Concluding that a restriction aimed at reducing the
depletion of clean air did fit within the meaning of Article XX(g),
the Panel proceeded to examine the other requirements. 4'
According to Venezuela, past Panels had interpreted "related to"
to mean "primarily aimed at" conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource, and "in conjunction with" as rendering
131. Id. at 41.
132 Id.
133. Id. at 40.
134. Id. at 41.
135. Id.
136. Id.







domestic restrictions effective. As to these requirements, the
Panel could draw no direct connection between improving the air
quality in the United States and imposing less favorable
treatment conditions on foreign producers.42 According to the
Panel, consistency with the no less favorable requirements of
Article III would in no way prevent the conservation of natural
resources in the United States.'44  The Panel reached the
conclusion that "the less favorable baseline establishment
methods at issue in this case were not primarily aimed at the
conservation of natural resources."'45 As it determined during its
analysis of Article XX(b), the Panel found it unnecessary to
consider whether the regulation would have satisfied the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.146
Following the Panel's decision, the United States appealed to
the WTO claiming that the Panel erred both in its holding that
the Article XX(g) justification was inapplicable and in its general
interpretation of Article XX.147 The United States argued that
the finding that its baseline establishment rules did not qualify
as a "measure". "relating to" the conservation of clean air and in
neglecting to proceed further to determine whether the
regulations would have satisfied the chapeau of Article XX.'
The Appellate Body determined that the Panel had erred in
its consideration of whether the "less favorable treatment" being
afforded importers was "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
an exhaustible natural resource rather than whether the
"measure" itself (the baseline establishment rules) was
"primarily aimed at" the conservation. 9 The Panel erred in
utilizing its legal determination that there had been a violation
of Article 111:4 as the "measure" that had to be primarily aimed
at conserving clean air."' By doing so, it rendered the Article XX
exceptions useless because the Panel had already established
that the baseline establishment rules would not be consistent in
142. Id. at 44.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 45.
145. Id.
146. See id. generally.
147. Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Standards For Reformulated And
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, Apr. 29, 1996 at 8.
148. Id. at 8-9.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 15.
20011
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the absence of an exception. 6' The Appellate Body advised that
the "chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the 'measures'
which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal
finding of less favorable treatment."'5 2 The Panel's interpretation
misinterpreted the meaning of the treaty by failing to take into
account the normal meaning of the words. Article 111:4 could not
be given such a broad reading as to swallow Article XX and its
inherent policy considerations.' After recognizing this mistake,
the Appellate Body concluded that the baseline establishment
rules were "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources and that they generally applied to both
domestic and imported gasoline." It added the qualification that
if it could be observed that there were no restrictions on domestic
products while there were a substantial amount on the like
imported products, then the measure could not be taken to be
"primarily aimed at" conservation and would be a form of naked
protectionism.' 5'
After the affirmative finding that the provisions of the
baseline establishment rules fell within the meaning of Article
XX(g), the Appellate Body proceeded further into the inquiry of
whether the regulation would satisfy the requirements of the
chapeau. In order to qualify for the exception, the regulation
could not amount to "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination
in international trade, nor could it be a "disguised restriction" on
trade. 6' The Appellate Body recognized the policy considerations
of the chapeau, which included the prevention of illegitimate use
or abuse of the exceptions.'57  In defense of its gasoline
regulations, the United States attested that if it were to use an
alternative system, it would encounter administrative problems
in effectuating enforcement jurisdiction over foreign persons."8
Additionally, since gasoline is a fungible product, refiners would
claim the most favorable refinery of origin, and difficulties would




154. Id. at 18.
155. Id. at 19.
156. See id. at 21-23.
157. Id. at 20.




Body recognized the reality of these concerns but found them
insubstantial in justifying the denial of individual baselines to
foreign refiners. 6 ° It agreed with the Panel that there were
many other measures that were reasonably available to the
United States."'
The Appellate Body found that the United States had failed
to engage in cooperative arrangements with Venezuela and
Brazil to overcome its concerns of enforcement and establishment
of individualized baselines.162 Additionally, the Appellate Body
scoffed at the United States for considering only its domestic
refiners when imposing the regulations and for not taking into
account the hardships that would fall upon the foreign refiners."'
In concluding that Article XX could not apply, the Appellate
Body stated that the initial Article III:4 violation, coupled with
the failure to cooperate with or to consider the impact on foreign
producers constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a
"disguised restriction on international trade."
64
C. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products
The most recent case involving the conflict between
international trade and the environment arose when several
countries challenged the United States' policies on the protection
of sea turtles. 65 The challenges came in response to the 1987
regulations issued by the United States pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. The regulations, effective as of
1990, imposed upon United States vessels the requirement to use
certain approved Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs") or to
implement shrimp fishing restrictions (tow-time restrictions) in
areas notoriously linked to the incidental killing of sea turtles
during shrimp harvestation. 66 The Initial regulations were
160. Id. at 24.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 26.
163. ld.
164. Id.
165. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain
Shrimp And Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998) available at
http'//www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu-e/58abr.htm [hereinafter Shrimp II].
166. Id at 4.
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amended to require that the TEDs be used all the time and in all
areas where it was likely that sea turtles would be present.
There were a few very limited exceptions to the use of the
approved TEDs. s7 On November 21, 1989, Section 609 was
enacted, requiring the United States Secretary of State to engage
in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with foreign nations to
agree on a way to protect and conserve sea turtles. Section 609
also imposed a ban on all imports of shrimp that were harvested
by methods that harmed sea turtles. The proposed ban would not
be applied to foreign nations that were "certified." 168 As to foreign
shrimp trawlers, there were two methods by which vessels could
become certified. First, certification would be given to countries
where the fishing environment posed no risk to sea turtles.9
The second way foreign country can gain certification by the
United States is by providing documentary evidence of
implementation of a system designed to regulate the incidental
taking of sea turtles. In addition to providing such
documentation, the nation is required to utilize programs that
result in effectiveness and results comparable to those of the
United States.7 ° The regulations go further to qualify the term
"comparable" as meaning that the use of TEDs is consistent to
the manner in which they are used by the United States."'
In reviewing the claims by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and
Thailand, the Panel concluded that the Section 609 ban on the
import of shrimp and shrimp products was inconsistent with
Article XI:1 of GATT 19941" and was not justified by the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id at 4-5. The regulatory guidelines of 1996 stated that if the following
conditions were met, a country would be certified without any further effort on the part of
the foreign government:
(a) Any harvesting nation without any of the relevant species of sea
turtles occurring in waters subject to its jurisdiction; (b) Any
harvesting nation that harvests shrimp exclusively by means that do
not pose a threat to sea turtles, e.g., any nation that harvests shrimp
exclusively by artisanal means; or (c) Any nation whose commercial
shrimp trawling operations take place exclusively in waters subject to
its jurisdiction in which sea turtles do not occur.
170. Id. at 5. According to the 1996 guidelines, certification shall be made as long as:
"(i) the required use of TEDs that are 'comparable in effectiveness to those used in the
United States. Any exceptions to this requirement must be comparable to those of the
United States program.. .'; and (ii) 'a credible enforcement effort that includes
monitoring for compliance and appropriate sanctions."
171. Id. at 5.
172. See GATT 1994, supra note 3.
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exceptions of Article XX."'
Due to the level of disagreement over the reasoning used by
the Panel and that of the Appellate Body, the two will be
examined together. The Appellate Body effectively reversed the
reasoning of the Panel and completed the analysis in light of
previous methods of treaty interpretation.
A quality that effectively distinguishes this case from the
other environmental cases is its procedural background. When
the United States filed its appeal, it attached to its submission
three briefs that were prepared by Non-governmental
Organizations ("NGOs"). The Joint Appellees were infuriated
and objected to the consideration of these amicus curiae briefs,
claiming that they were inconsistent with Article 17.6 of the
DSU. 17' The Appellate Body disposed of this concern by
requesting that the United States disclose its agreement with the
briefs that were affixed to the appellate submission. The United
States responded by claiming that it was limiting the scope of its
agreement with the amicus briefs only to those issues concurring
with those raised in its submission, and was merely including the
NGO briefs as independent determinations by organizations
having "a great interest, and specialized expertise, in sea turtle
conservation and related matters."' 6 Finding that the United
States' response was adequate to render the material a
component of its appeal, the Appellate Body admitted the briefs,
considering them to the extent that they supported the legal
arguments in the appellate submission. 7'
Moving forward from the resolution of the procedural issue,
the United States also requested that the Appellate Body
determine whether the Panel erred in first considering the
chapeau of Article XX, thereby finding unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevailed, and not determining any of the provisions of Article
x 1
78
In its interpretation of Section 609 under Article XX of GATT
173. Shrimp II, supra note 164, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 20. Article 17.6 states that on appeal, interpretations should be limited to
the issues and interpretations that were considered by the Panel. Id.
176. Id. at 22.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 24, 28.
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1994, the Panel concluded that the measure taken by the United
States completely undermined the purposes of the multilateral
trading system.179  Additionally, it found that the measure
constituted unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevailed since it conditioned access to the
United States markets on compliance with conservation policies
comparable to those of the United States. The Panel ended its
analysis there, thus deviating from the reasoning used in both
the Tuna-Dolphin disputes and the Gasoline dispute. 1"0 The
Appellate Body noted that the Panel failed to apply the
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law" as
stipulated in Article 3.2 of the DSU. Its errors included failure to
read the relevant portion, Article XX, of the treaty in light of its
object and purpose. Instead, it referred to the purpose of the
whole GATT 1994, analyzing the design of the measure being
utilized and not the manner in which it was applied.' This
analytical approach should have been used in assessing the
measure in light of the immediate context of the involved
provisions of Article XX, not the chapeau itself. The Appellate
Body stressed the importance of adhering to the requirements of
the multilateral system but recognized that the opening clause of
Article XX existed as a safeguard to prevent abuse of its
exceptions, not as an absolute barrier to their invocation. 1 2 By
reversing the sequence of analysis used by prior panels, the
Panel effectively "render[ed] a measure a priori incapable of
justification under Article XX."'' By conditioning access to the
market for shrimp on adoption of United States policies, the
United States acted unilaterally contrary to its GATT 1994
obligations. The exceptions laid out in sections (a)-(j) of Article
XX exist in order to justify such otherwise inconsistent behavior
when the policies are recognized as legitimate in nature 4 For
the above reason, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's
findings and proceeded to analyze Section 609 pursuant to the
"exhaustible natural resources" exception of Article XX(g). The
179. Id. at 28.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 30. The Panel emphasized its focus on the unilateral measure taken by
the United States in this particular situation, which it said compromised the integrity of
the multilateral trading system. Id.
182. Id.




chapeau would be considered only after determining that the
United States measure would be eligible for the Article XX
justification.8 '
First, the Appellate Body considered whether Section 609
was a measure to preserve or conserve an exhaustible natural
resource. Recognizing the fact that the sea turtles were listed in
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"), it was not difficult for the
Appellate Body to arrive at the conclusion that sea turtles were
natural resources and were exhaustible.186  Therefore, the
measure was deemed to be a conservation effort that satisfied the
requirement of the first prong of Article XX(g).
Next, the Appellate Body concluded that the design and
structure of the policy was a means to the ends of accomplishing
the goal of conserving sea turtles. The Appellate Body
determined this by noting that the structure of Section 609 was
not overly broad and related clearly and directly to its purpose."'
Determining that the measure was "related to" the conservation
of an exhaustible natural resource, the Appellate Body concluded
that Section 609 satisfied the second prong of Article XX(g)
scrutiny."18
The final determination that had to be made before
proceeding to the chapeau was whether the measure was applied
evenhandedly, thereby being making it effective "in conjunction
with," restrictions on domestic production or consumption.189 As
a result of the requirements of Section 609, which were modified
to force United States shrimp fisherman to use approved TEDs
wherever and whenever there was a likelihood that they would
encounter sea turtles, the Appellate Body concluded that the
measures were made "in conjunction with" domestic policies and
that the third prong of Article XX(g) was satisfied. 9 '
185. Id. at 32.
186. Id. at 34.
187. Id. at 35. The Appellate Body concluded that the measure exempted from its
provisions shrimp that were caught where there was no likelihood of the existence of sea
turtles. It also did not prohibit the import of shrimp caught in the waters of certified
countries. Reviewing the two certification processes, the Appellate Body found that the
requirements of use of TEDs would directly coincide with the decrease in mortality of sea
turtles. Id. at 36.
188. Id. at 35.




After concluding that the Section 609 qualified for the
justification afforded by Article XX(g), the Appellate Body tackled
the complicated task of determining whether the measure would
survive the rigid application of the chapeau.' This "second tier"
of the analysis required that the measure be found to be neither
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" nor a "disguised
restriction on international trade."19 In order to be fail the
requirements of the chapeau, the United States efforts had to be
deemed to go beyond mere noncompliance with Article XI:1 of
GATT 1994.193 Reflecting on recent activities of the WTO, the
Appellate Body weighed the principle of "sustainable
development" against the safeguarding of an open multilateral
trading system. It recognized that "a balance must be struck
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under
Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the
treaty rights of the other Members."5 4 In determining this
balance, the Appellate Body acknowledged the fact that the
United States applied a uniform system throughout its domestic
shrimp trawling system, but noted that it had failed to take into
consideration the prevalent conditions in other countries where
use of TEDs may not be feasible.9 An even greater omission on
the part of the United States was its failure to conduct bilateral
or multilateral negotiations with other countries to attempt to
come to a cooperative agreement. In fact, Section 609 itself
required that such negotiations be initiated and the recent Inter-
American Convention was evidence that such an alternate was
reasonably available to the United States.9 The Appellate Body
concluded that, by negotiating with some but not all Members
for a solution to the sea turtle problem, the United States was
guilty of unjustifiable discrimination.'97  Furthermore, the
Appellate Body found Section 609 to constitute "arbitrary
discrimination" since there was no explanation or notice given as
191. See generally Parameters, supra note 31.
192. Shrimp II, supra note 164, at 38.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 40.
195. Id. at 43.
196. Id. at 46.
197. Id. There were some wider Caribbean and western Atlantic countries that
committed themselves to using TEDs pursuant to the guidelines of 1991 and 1993. Other
countries that were subject to the later guidelines of 1996 were given only four months to
comply with using TEDs. The unequal burden on these Members led to a discriminatory
impact. Id. at 47.
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to why a country was or was not granted certification. Deciding
that the unjustifiable and arbitrary nature of the discrimination
was enough to cause the measure to fail the requirements of the
chapeau, the Appellate Body chose not to determine whether the
measure was also a "disguised restriction on trade."9 ' Once
again, the United States was unsuccessful at utilizing the
justification afforded by Article XX. This time, as in the
Appellate decision of the Gasoline case, its efforts only failed to
hurdle the chapeau.
IV. SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN
SUCCESSFULLY UTILIZE ARTICLE XX TO RECONCILE THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
The conflict between international trade and environmental
concerns has led to frustration and anger on the part of many
environmentalists in the United States. Many fear that
multilateral agreements such as the GATT 1994 will lead to
relaxation of American environmental policy and to a general
"race to the bottom" by the Contracting Parties of the world.
However, the environmentalists' pessimistic outlook is founded
upon the premise that there is no available methodology that
allows countries to conform with the requirements of the GATT
1994 and the interests in protecting the environment. After
analyzing the Dolphin-Tuna, Gasoline, and Sea Turtle-Shrimp
cases, perhaps a more accurate statement is that recourse is
available under the GATT environmental protection exceptions
for countries desiring to balance trade policies with
environmental concerns, but that such recourse will be denied to
countries like the United States when the policy at issue is
predominately economically motivated policy
Rather than relying on the GATT, the United States could
accomplish its trade policy objectives by simply invoking rigid
environmental policies where deemed necessary and effective,
including the right to restrict the use and import of harmful or
dangerously produced products where other measures are not
available, thereby imposing standards and regulations on both
the United States and foreign countries. Such impositions
should be reasonable and imposed only if cooperation has been
198. Id. at 49.
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rendered ineffective. In addition, countervailing considerations,
such as a foreign nation's ability to comply with the United
States regulations, must also be taken into account. The United
States should allow flexible time for conformity and when
possible offer resources to less developed countries that may
otherwise not be able to conform. Perhaps exchanges in
technology and resources could be offered by more developed
nations as incentive to cooperate with efforts to protect the
environment. We may look to the language in the three decisions
for guidance in determining solid suggestions as to how to solve
the most pressing conflicts between the environment and
international trade.
Reflecting on the decisions of the two panels in the Dolphin-
Tuna cases, the most egregious mistake made by the United
States was its failure to exhaust reasonable alternative measures
that were available to accomplish its policy objective. The
Dolphin-Tuna II Panel also cited the fact that the attempted
restrictions couldn't possibly be "primarily aimed" at the
conservation of exhaustible resources since the only way that
they could be effective would be if other countries did indeed
change their domestic policies. By engaging in multilateral or
bilateral negotiations, or by amending or supplementing the
existing GATT 1994 provisions to permit environmental trade
measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with the
Agreement would be an effective way to address the problem
without resorting to unilateral action. Again, the underlying
purpose of the GATT 1994 is for Members to work multilaterally
to strike a balance between trade and international
environmental problems.
If efforts to negotiate reach an impasse, the United States
does have more narrowly tailored methods of environmental
protection at its disposal. The Panels did not reject the United
States' labeling restrictions on tuna. Internal measures such as
the "Dolphin-safe" logo can be used to achieve awareness on the
part of the American public while maintaining the United States'
obligations under the GATT 1994. However, in order to pass
muster before future panels, such measures should be resorted to
only after good faith attempts at agreement fail.
In the Gasoline case, The Panel found that the United States
was engaging in less favorable treatment since chemically-
equivalent products were being treated differently. A method by
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which standards were developed based on an average clearly
resulted in less favorable treatment in one instance and more
favorable treatment in another. Regardless of whether the
United States established its statutory baseline in good faith, a
unilateral attempt at offsetting losses to one producer to the
benefit of another producer was not a sufficient way to draw the
line as it could potentially lead to the collapse of competition,
thereby undermining the fundamental purposes of GATT 1994.
A more favorable approach would be that suggested by the
Appellate Body of allowing all foreign producers to establish
individual baselines where there was competent and reliable
data to do so. All three Methods utilized by domestic producers
should be made available to foreign producers. Additionally,
reasonable measures should have been taken to ensure
compliance. Foreign enforcement mechanisms should be
established by cooperative arrangements as was done effectively
in past situations.
As a matter of policy and as was done in the Dolphin-Tuna
and Sea Turtle-Shrimp cases, consideration of hardships need be
given not only to domestic producers but also foreign producers.
Another major flaw in the United States imposition of the
Gasoline Rule was that it did not ensure that the gasoline
governed by individual baselines would conform with the 1990
average levels. In other words, the policy being furthered would
be defeated by domestic refiners and foreign refiners that were
granted an individualized baseline since there was no maximum
cap on production. Imposition of a system that establishes a limit
on the volume of gasoline that can be produced at the individual
baselines would be more effective at achieving the goal of
preserving clean air.
Perhaps the most obvious omission on the part of the United
States as to its duty to negotiate arose in the Sea Turtle-Shrimp
case. Even the uniformly applied measures of the domestic
shrimp trawling system were proven ineffective since they failed
to take into consideration the prevalent conditions in other
countries where use of TEDs may not be feasible. Section 609
itself serves as evidence in determining that the United States
engaged in unjustifiable discrimination since it by its terms
required that "serious, across-the-board negotiations" be initiated
with other countries in order to conserve sea turtles. By
2001]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
engaging in multilateral negotiations, the United States may
have been justified in imposing an import ban had its efforts
failed.
In order for future efforts not to be characterized as
"arbitrary discrimination," the United States should also devise a
well-structured system that sets guidelines for officials to follow
when approving or disapproving a foreign country's conservation
policies. There needs to be a formal procedure by which different
countries' measures are evaluated, as well as, a forum in which
grievances can be heard and addressed. Through multilateral
agreement, the United States need not shoulder this burden
alone. The concluding remarks of the Appellate Body in the Sea
Turtle- Shrimp case reinforce the notion that the WTO supports
cooperative efforts to protect the environment. It recommends
that Members act together "bilaterally, plurilaterally or
multilaterally" to protect the environment. By exhausting the
possibilities of negotiation before imposing unilateral trade
embargoes on other Members of GATT 1994, the United States
could and should enforce its policies toward preservation of the
environment.
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